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This paper considers a model of spatial allocation of investment capital under uncertainty. We demonstrate that the 
spatial concentration of economic activity depends upon properties of risk preferences deeper than risk aversion. The 
degree of so-called relative prudence unambiguously decides whether or not the diversi cation of income risk favours the 
geographic dispersion of economic activity. In our framework we relate risk diversi cation with economic integration. 
Then  there  exists  risk  preferences  so  that  spatial  concentration  of  industry  and  capital  is  not  a 
ected by the degree of economic integration or segmentation of the regions. We also study the impact of net return 
regressibility upon spatial allocation. 
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The literature in spatial and regional economics has developed a fundamental
interest in the allocation of resources and the role of agglomeration and diver-
siﬁcation of capital to regions or countries.1 In particular, economic develop-
ment aspects of capital agglomeration (OECD 2005), the location decisions
of international ﬁrms (Pontes (2005), and the economics of the induction of
a clustering process have been subject to thorough investigation stressing,
among other things, the importance of spatial economies of scale and scope
(Fujita et al. (1999), OECD (2007a), Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009)).
Dispersion forces, e.g. the ‘local competition’ force, favour the geographic
dispersion of economic activity whereas agglomeration forces, e.g. ‘market
size’ force, favour the geographic concentration. Uncertainty of regional re-
turns on investments is also on the realm of spatial economics. Hence opti-
mum spatial distribution of scarce resources and optimum decision on the
location of ﬁrms’ business activities are aﬀected by a ‘risk-diversiﬁcation’
force. That is, risk-averse ﬁrms are attracted to regions with higher expected
net returns on investment and lower return risk. In addition, the correlation
of random regional returns is important and measures the risk-diversiﬁcation
potential of inter-regional activities of ﬁrms (Chiang (2009), OECD (2007b)).
In order to identify the (risk-)diversiﬁcation force as a dispersion or an
agglomeration force we need a deeper inspection of risk preferences. Our ap-
proach reveals that relative prudence and the elasticity of risk aversion with
respect to changes in income risk, respectively, allows for a closer inspection of
the diversiﬁcation force. The degree of relative prudence determines whether
or not diversiﬁcation acts as a pro-concentration or anti-concentration force.
In general, it is not true that diversiﬁcation tends to disperse economic activ-
2ities of ﬁrms. Income and substitution elasticities matter and determine the
magnitude of relative prudence. This fact may contribute to the explanation
of disturbing empirical results in spatial econometrics (see, e.g. Duranton
(2008)).
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 presents our model of spa-
tial allocation and discusses corner vs. interior solutions of optimum capital
sharing over regions. In section 3 we state the condition for a non-symmetric
regional capital allocation. Section 4 presents our main results. It relates the
correlation of uncertain regional returns on investment to spatial allocation
subject to the structure of risk preferences. The main theoretical contribution
of the paper is the insight, that economic integration may well agglomerate
investment capital rather than disperse it.
2. A Model of Spatial Allocation
A risk-averse ﬁrm, located in a spatial economy with two regions, has I units
of capital endowment which would earn uncertain returns from investments in
either region. Let ˜ c1 and ˜ c2 denote locational random costs of doing business
in region 1 and 2, respectively. The random costs diﬀerential from location,
˜ ∆=˜ c2 − ˜ c1, is based, for example, on diﬀerent land prices, productivities,
business environment, industrial policy, regulations, ﬁscal and tax policies
etc. which leads to random diﬀerences in regional net returns. We model
business costs of the ﬁrm at the subnational level such that (1 − ˜ ci)R is
retained as the uncertain net return per unit of investment in region i(i =
1,2), where R denotes gross return at the national level.
Random income of the ﬁrm, ˜ Y , comes from doing business in the regions,
where s denotes spatial allocation of investment capital to region 1. Capital
3share (1 − s) goes to region 2. Hence the ﬁrm’s future income is deﬁned as:
˜ Y = [(1 − ˜ c1)s +( 1− ˜ c2)(1 − s)]RI. (1)
Given some risk preferences, maximizing expected utility of income with
respect to regional capital allocation s is to solve the following decision prob-
lem:
max
s EU(˜ Y ), (2)
where E represents the expectation operator. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is thrice continuously diﬀerentiable: Marginal
utility is positive, i.e. ∂U/∂Y = U￿ > 0, and decreasing, i.e. ∂U￿/∂Y =
U￿￿ < 0, which means risk aversion. The derivative ∂U￿￿/∂Y = U￿￿￿ is not
sign-constrained. Kimball (1990, 1993) associates this derivative with pru-
dent behaviour.2 Prudence becomes relevant when analysing diversiﬁcation
as an agglomeration or dispersion force in the economic theory of geography.
The ﬁrst-order condition for optimum spatial allocation where the choice
variable must be nonnegative requires:
EU
￿(˜ Y )˜ ∆ ≤ 0,s ≥ 0 and sEU
￿(˜ Y )˜ ∆=0 . (3)
(i) Consider s = 0. If (positive) correlation of regional costs ˜ c1 and ˜ c2 does
not exceed a critical level,3 from income equation (1) we obtain:
cov(U
￿(Y ), ˜ ∆)|s=0 =c o v ( U
￿[(1 − ˜ c2)RI], ˜ ∆) ≥ 0.
From optimum conditions (3) we get:
EU
￿(˜ Y )˜ ∆=EU
￿(˜ Y )E ˜ ∆+c o v ( U
￿(˜ Y ), ˜ ∆) ≤ 0.
Hence the expected costs diﬀerential cannot be positive, in other words,
E˜ c2 ≤ E˜ c1, since marginal utility is positive. Therefore, a corner solution
4of perfect agglomeration in region 2 requires that region 1 has no expected
regional costs advantage.4
(ii) Consider s>0. Then the classical ﬁrst-order condition must hold:
EU
￿(˜ Y )˜ ∆=0 . (4)
Let us summerize our discussion as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose there exists an expected regional costs advantage
in favour of region 1, i.e. E˜ c2 >E˜ c1, and suppose an appropriately bounded
positive correlation of regional costs. Then partial agglomeration/some dis-
persion occurs, i.e. 0 <s<1.
The proof follows from the above discussion.
Given that each location has its speciﬁc expected return, risk preferences
play a pivotal role when one analyses the impact of return risk diﬀerences
due to location upon spatial allocation of capital. In this context, distance is
most important for the correlation of regional returns on investment. Large
geographical distance may even result in negatively correlated net returns.
Geography matters in the correlation of stock indexes (Fasnacht & Louberg´ e
(2007)).
Suppose that regional policy calls for a harmonization of economic con-
ditions of location. For example, tax harmonization is high on the political
agenda of the European Union countries. With globalization in general, re-
gional policy often wants the world to become “ﬂatter” (Friedman (2007)).
Then locational distance becomes less important and uncertain returns on
investment are more positively correlated. Does this process lead to more
agglomeration or more dispersion of capital in the regions? In other words,
5does risk diversiﬁcation promote spatial concentration of economic activity
or discourage such concentration?
New literature of economic geography leads potentially to surprising con-
clusions with respect to harmonization, for it takes explicitly into account
agglomeration and dispersion forces (Brakman et al. (2008)).
We demonstrate that ﬁrms’ risk preferences determine whether or not di-
versiﬁcation is an agglomeration or dispersion force. Suppose risk preferences
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). If regional policy leads to
more diversiﬁcation opportunities in spatial allocation, then the diversiﬁca-
tion force can be seen as a dispersion force; economic activity becomes less
concentrated over the regions (Broll et al. (2005)).
3. Perfect Dispersion of Capital Allocation
As an illustration of the aim of our investigation consider former Western
and Eastern Germany and today’s federal and local governments’ regional
economic policy. We observe many political initiatives intending to harmonize
regional standard of living (Brakman et al. (2008)). What are the conditions
under which ﬁrms have an incentive to diversify investments across regions?
Most important are locational diﬀerences in the costs from doing business.
In order to pinpoint this insight we study the conditions for an even split of
capital between region 1 and 2. Thereby we disregard the costs magnitude and
focus on the diﬀerence of regional costs. For technical reasons we, therefore,
introduce the following constraint.
Assumption (A1). Let Prob(˜ c ≤ ￿) = 1, where ˜ c =( ˜ c1 +˜ c2)/2.
In order to motivate and describe the meaning of assumption (A1) let us
6consider the following restatement of the ﬁrm’s income equation (1):
˜ Y = [(s − 1/2)˜ ∆+( 1− ˜ c)]RI. (5)
By using equation (5), let us diﬀerentiate expected utility of income with
respect to allocation s to region 1. If we evaluate the result at point s = 1
2,









￿[(1 − ˜ c)RI]˜ ∆,
≈ U
￿(RI)E ˜ ∆. (6)
Hence spatial allocation is symmetric if and only if expected net returns do
not diﬀer locationally.
The following result reveals the importance of the costs diﬀerential be-
tween regions.
Proposition 2. Suppose assumption (A1) holds. If expected business costs
are identical between regions, then allocative dispersion is perfect, i.e. s =
1/2. If expected business costs diﬀer between regions, than the region with
the lower expected costs gets the higher capital share.
Proof. From the ﬁrst-order condition (4) we obtain
EU
￿(˜ Y )E ˜ ∆=−cov(U
￿(˜ Y ), ˜ ∆). (7)
Since U￿ > 0 we get signE ˜ ∆=−signcov(U￿(˜ Y ), ˜ ∆). Using assumption (A1),
the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s income (5) and the properties of the utility function
we obtain signcov(U￿(˜ Y ), ˜ ∆) = −sign(s − 1/2). Therefore, sign(s − 1/2) =
signE ˜ ∆ = sign(E˜ c2 − E˜ c1). This proves the claim.
E ˜ ∆ > 0 implies that there is an intrinsic bias in favour of allocating
capital to region 1. From equation (7) we see that the magnitude of the
7asymmetry in spatial allocation also depends upon risk preferences and the
assessment of the probability distribution of net returns.
4. Diversiﬁcation Force and Risk Preferences
In the following we investigate on the interaction between spatial allocation
of capital, geographical distance and risk preferences. Empirically, distance
(Fasnacht & Louberg´ e (2007)) and segmentation of markets (Bekaert et al.
(2007)) aﬀect the correlation of regional returns on investment.
4.1. Regional Costs Correlation
There exist a diversiﬁcation force in the economics of geography under un-
certainty. Depending upon risk preferences this force becomes either a pro-
concentration (agglomeration) force or an anti-concentration (dispersion)
force. This insight will be demonstrated.
Suppose that tighter economic integration, e.g. tighter European inte-
gration, leads to more transparency of the economic conditions of speciﬁc
locations. Then locational distance and segmentation of markets becomes
less important. We presume that the correlation of regional net returns is
inversely related to distance and the degree of segmentation. Other things
being equal, this implies that the variance of the locational costs diﬀerential
decreases if integration becomes tighter.5
In order to analyse how the correlation of uncertain locational costs aﬀects
spatial allocation via risk preferences we use a mean preserving spread/shrink
in the relevant random variable, which is a well-known deﬁnition of increas-
ing/decreasing risk (Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970)). The well-known expected
utility approach leads to the concept of prudence (Kimball (1990)).
8We introduce the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions. (i) Let ˜ ∆k denote a mean preserving shrink of the costs diﬀer-
ential ˜ ∆. (ii) Let P(Y )=
U￿￿￿(Y )
−U￿￿(Y )Y denote relative prudence.
The following result reports the relationship between the degree of ag-
glomeration in spatial allocation, costs correlation as a diversiﬁcation force
and risk preferences.
Proposition 3. Be E ˜ ∆=E ˜ ∆k > 0 and, therefore, s>1/2. A mean
preserving shrink in the costs diﬀerential leads to less inter-regional disparity
in capital allocation if and only if relative prudence exceeds 2.
Remark: One may consider as a benchmark of the ﬁrm’s utility function
the generalized logarithmic utility function U(Y )=Y + γ lnY, γ > 0. This
utility function exhibits P(Y ) = 2 (Battermann et al. (2008)).
Proof. (1◦) From Proposition 2 we have sign(s − 1/2) = signE ˜ ∆. Let
f(z)=zU￿(z). Hence f￿(z)=U￿(z)+zU￿￿(z) and f￿￿(z)=2 U￿￿(z)+
zU￿￿￿(z). Rearranging terms yields f￿￿(z)=−U￿￿(z)(P(z)−2), where P(z)=
−zU￿￿￿(z)/U￿￿(z). Since U￿￿(z) < 0 we obtain signf￿￿(z) = sign(P(z) − 2).
(2◦) From the ﬁrst-order condition (4) and deﬁnition (i) we obtain
EU￿(˜ Yk)˜ ∆k < (=) [>] 0, where by Jensen’s inequality the sign depends
upon the convexity of the argument. Note that we consider a mean-
preserving shrink, hence, convexity (linearity) [concavity] holds if and only
if P(Y ) > (=)[<]2, since income increases with the costs diﬀerential. There-
fore, signEU￿(˜ Yk)˜ ∆k = −sign(P(Y ) − 2).
(3◦) In order to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition, former optimum spatial al-
location (before the shrink occured) must be adjusted. Therefore, s declines
as a result of a mean preserving shrink if and only if P(Y ) > 2. The claim
follows.
9Proposition 3 reveals that preferences of the ﬁrm play a pivotal role when
one evaluates the diversiﬁcation force upon spatial allocation. Regarding
the allocation of resources over space and the location of economic activity
risk preferences, more precisely the degree of relative prudence, determine
whether or not the diversiﬁcation force is a dispersion force, i.e. favours the
geographic dispersion of industry and capital. Surpricingly, for some charac-
teristic of preferences - deeper than risk aversion - the diversiﬁcation force
has to be seen as an agglomeration force.
To work out the economic intuition behind Proposition 3 we relate our
ﬁnding to the framework of two-moment decision models (Meyer (1987)).
This allows us to apply the notion of elasticity of risk aversion.
Corollary. Suppose a mean preserving shrink in the regional costs diﬀer-
ential. Then (in)elastic risk aversion leads to dispersion (agglomeration) in
spatial allocation. Spatial allocation is not aﬀected by the diversiﬁcation force
if and only if risk preferences exhibit unit elasticity of risk aversion.
Proof. From the discussion above we obtain sign(P(Y )−2) = sign(ε−1),
where ε denotes the elasticity of risk aversion (Broll et al. (2006)).
The risk aversion elasticity with respect to changes in the standard de-
viation of uncertain income incorporates a substitution and income eﬀect.
The ﬁnal eﬀect of a correlation change on spatial allocation is unknown and
depends on preferences. If substitution and income eﬀect cancel out, the
diversiﬁcation force is neutral to spatial allocation.
104.2. Regional Costs Regression
There is a growing literature in the empirics of dispersion and agglomeration
with various diﬀerent approaches (Head & Mayer (2004)). It is common in the
empirical literature of spatial economics to study economic eﬀects of policy
measures under the presumption that economic variables are related by some
sophisticated regression (see, e.g., Fingleton (2008)).
To study the impact upon the regional share of capital of a (linear) corre-
lation between locational costs of doing business we introduce the following
straightforward regression.
Assumption (A2). Consider the regression speciﬁcation of regional business
costs: ˜ c1 = α + β˜ c2 +˜ u, whereE(˜ u|c2)=0 .
Remark: There exists a systematic relationship between uncertain loca-
tional costs ˜ c1 and ˜ c2. The linear relation is obscured by an uncorrelated noise
˜ u with zero conditional mean. Note that E(˜ u|c2) = 0 implies cov(˜ c2, ˜ u)=0 ,
since E˜ c2˜ u = E[˜ c2E(˜ u|˜ c2)].
Deﬁnition. Let A(Y )=
−U￿￿(Y )
U￿(Y ) and A(Y )Y denote the Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure of absolute and relative risk aversion, respectively.
The following result reports how the agglomeration of investments reacts
on costs regressibility given some risk preferences.
Proposition 4. Let E ˜ ∆ > 0 and, therefore, s>1/2. Suppose the regression
relationship strengthens such that the regression parameter β increases. Then
the inter-regional disparity in capital allocation diminishes if the degree of
relative risk aversion does not exceed unity.




= signE{A(˜ Y )˜ Y − 1 − A(˜ Y )(1 − ˜ c2)RI}U
￿(˜ Y )˜ c2. (8)
11Since A(Y )(1−c2)RI > 0, the overall term in brackets is negative if the level
of relative risk aversion does not exceed unity. The claim follows.
Under our regressional condition and some speciﬁc risk preferences eco-
nomic integration achieves more dispersed spatial allocation in the country.
The reason is that, in the ﬁrst place, an increase in regression parameter
β decreases the locational costs diﬀerential in expected value. This makes
dominant region 1 less attractive than region 2. On the other hand, diver-
siﬁcation potentiality lessens since business costs are more correlated. Risk
preferences have to exhibit a level of relative risk aversion below a critical
level so that the net eﬀect of more integrated or correlated regions leads to
less agglomeration of capital investments.
Note, however, that according to empirical studies (see, e.g., Friend &
Blume (1975)), coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion are typically far in excess
of unity. Hence, at some point, agglomeration of capital will occur, that is, the
diversiﬁcation force becomes and agglomeration force. The reason is that the
ﬁrms’ beneﬁt from a lower business costs diﬀerential is overcompensated by
the disutility of reduced diversiﬁcation opportunities. This is in line with the
empirical evidence of capital agglomeration in the OECD countries (OECD
(2005)).
4.3. Comparison
In general, preferences determine whether or not the diversiﬁcation force
tends to disperse economic activity. In Proposition 3 we demonstrate that
the degree of relative prudence is a necessary and suﬃcient magnitude to
identify diversiﬁcation as a dispersion force or an agglomeration force. No
speciﬁc statistical assumptions - besides some basic regularity assumptions -
12on the probability distribution of uncertain regional costs are introduced.
On the other hand, if we put some constraint on the stochastic properties
of uncertain business costs, e.g. the regressibility of regional costs of Assump-
tion (A2), less information about the preference structure - in our case the
degree of relative risk aversion - has to be considered to derive a suﬃcient
condition for our result.
Loosely speaking, there exist some trade-oﬀ between the preference and
stochastic setting of assumptions in order to derive our ﬁndings. This fact
may be important to evaluate empirical research in spatial economics.
5. Conclusion
The paper is concerned with spatial economics under uncertainty. The al-
location of scarce resources over space is driven by so-called agglomeration
and dispersion forces. Depending upon the structure of risk preferences we
demonstrate whether or not the diversiﬁcation force promotes or discourages
spatial concentration of economic activity.
We consider risk-averse ﬁrms doing business under uncertain regional
net returns on investments. One region is presumed to have an advantage in
expected net returns, i.e. there is some inter-regional disparity of capital allo-
cation. Uncertain regional net returns are (less than perfect positively) corre-
lated and provide some diversiﬁcation opportunity. We identify the Kimball-
measure of relative prudence (or, the elasticity of risk aversion) as the entity
that allows us to relate the diversiﬁcation force to pro-concentration forces
and anti-concentration forces, respectively. This theoretical insight should
prove to be helpful in the empirics of spatial economics. The structure of risk
preferences is a spatial fundamental.
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5 Note that corr[(1−˜ c1)R,(1−˜ c2)R] = corr(˜ c1,˜ c2), where corr denotes the correlation




Baldwin, R. & Wyplosz, C. (2009) The Economics of European Integration, 3rd
edn, London, McGraw-Hill.
Battermann, H. L., Broll, U. & Wahl, J. E. (2008) Utility functions of equiva-
lent form and the eﬀect of parameter changes on optimum decicion making,
Economic Theory, 34, 401-414.
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R., Lundblad, C. & Siegel, S. (2007) Global growth
opportunities and market integration, The Journal of Finance, 62, 1081-
1137.
Brakman, S., Garretson, H. & van Marrewijk, C. (2008) Agglomeration and gov-
ernment spending, in: Brakman, S. & Garretson, H. (eds), Foreign Direct
14Investment and the Multinational Enterprise, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,
89-116.
Brakman, S., Garretson, H. & van Marrewijk, C. (2001) An Introduction to Ge-
ographical Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Broll, U., Marjit, S. & Wahl, J. E. (2005) Regional policy, integration and the
distribution of foreign investment, Review of Regional Research (Jahrbuch
f¨ ur Regionalwissenschaften), 25, 107-112.
Broll, U., Wahl, J. E. & Wong, W.-K. (2006) Elasticity of risk aversion and
international trade, Economics Letters, 92, 126-130.
Chiang, S. (2009) The eﬀects of industrial diversiﬁcation on regional unemploy-
ment in Taiwan: Is the portfolio theory applicable? Annals of Regional Sci-
ence, 43, 947-962.
Duranton, G. (2008) Spatial Economics, in: Durlauf, S. N. & Blume, L. G. (eds),
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan.
Fasnacht, P. & Louberg´ e, H. (2007) International stock market correlations: A
sectoral approach, Working Paper (December), Dept. of Political Economics,
University of Geneva.
Fingleton, B. (2008) A generalized method of moments estimator for a spatial
panel model with an endogenous spatial lag and spatial moving average
errors, Spatial Economic Analysis, 3, 27-44.
Friedman, T. L. (2007) The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-ﬁrst
Century. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus und Giroux.
Friend, I. & Blume, M. E. (1975) The demand for risky assets, American Eco-
nomic Review, 65, 900-922.
Fujita, M. (ed) (2005) Spatial Economics, vol. I and II. Cheltenham, UK and
Northhampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. & Venables, A. J. (1999) The Spatial Economy. Cities,
Regions, and International Trade, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
15Head, K. & Mayer, Th. (2004) The empirics of agglomeration and trade, in: Hen-
derson, V. & Thisse, J.F. (eds), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
4, Amsterdam, North Holland, 2609-2696.
Kimball, M. P. (1990) Precautionary saving in the small and in the large, Econo-
metrica, 58, 53-73.
Kimball, M. P. (1993) Standard risk aversion, Econometrica, 61, 589-611.
Krugman, P. R. (1991) Geography and Trade, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Krugman, P. R. & Venables, A. (1995) Globalization and the inequality of nations,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 60, 857-880.
Machnes, Y. & Wong, K. P. (2003) A note on deductible insurance and produc-
tion, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 28, 73-80.
Meyer, J. (1987) Two-moment decision models and expected utility maximizia-
tion, American Economic Review, 77, 421-430.
OECD (2005) Regions at a Glance, Paris, OECD Publishing.
OECD (2007a) Globalisation and Regional Economies. Can OECD Regions Com-
pete in Global Industries?, Paris, OECD Publishing.
OECD (2007b) Staying Competitive in the Global Economy. Moving Up the Value
Chain, Paris, OECD Publishing.
Pﬂ¨ uger, M. (2004) Economic integration, wage policies amd social policies, Oxford
Economic Papers, 56, 135-150.
Pﬂ¨ uger, M. & S¨ udekum, J. (2008) Integration, agglomeration and welfare, Journal
of Urban Economics, 63, 544-566.
Pontes, J.P. (2005) Intermediate goods and the location of productive activity,
Annals of Regional Science, 39, 11-24.
Puga, D. (2002) European regional policies in light of recent location theories,
Journal of Economic Geography, 2, 373-406.
Rothschild, M. & Stiglitz, J. E. (1970) Increasing risk: I. A deﬁnition, Journal of
Economic Theory, 2, 225-243.
16 
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 
 
10/08  Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, B. Cornelia: An Evolutionary Agent-Based Simulation Model for the 
Industry Lifecycle 
11/08  Mukherjee, Vivekananda / Ramani, Shyama V.: R&D Cooperation, Asymmetrical Technological 
Capabilities and Rationale for Technology Parks 
12/08  Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco / Roth, Gerhard / Thießen, Friedrich: Die (innere) Logik des 
Entscheidens – Zur neurobiologischen Fundierung ökonomischer Entscheidungen 
13/08  Dopfer, Kurt: Zur Neubestimmung von Geschichte und Theoriegeschichte in den 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften – Ko-evolution von Wirtschaftsbeobachtung und Wirtschaftswirklichkeit 
14/08  Lessmann, Christian / Markwardt, Gunther: One Size fits all? Decentralization, Corruption, and the 
Monitoring of Bureaucrats 
15/08  Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza / Markwardt, Gunther: The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on the 
Iranian Economy  
16/08  Fuchs, Michaela / Wohlrabe, Klaus: Instituitions, Trade and Integration: What can be expected 
within the enlarged EU? 
01/09  Broll, Udo / Egozcue, Martin / Wong, Wing-Keung: Prospect Theory and Two Moment Model: the 
Firm under Price Uncertainty 
02/09  Broll, Udo / Eckwert, Berhard: Modelling Information and Hedging: the Exporting Firm 
03/09  Binswanger, Hans Christoph: Die Wachstumsspirale in der Krise – Ansätze zu einem nachhaltigem 
Wachstum 
04/09  Brunow, Stefan / Hirte, Georg: Regional Age Structure and Economic Growth: An Econometric 
Study for German Regions 
05/09  Broll, Udo / Kemnitz, Alexander / Mukherjee, Vivekananda: Globalization and a Welfare Program 
for the Marginalized 
06/09  Tscharaktschiew, Stefan / Hirte, Georg: An Urban General Equilibrium Model with Multiple 
Household Structures and Travel Mode Choice  
07/09  Tscharaktschiew, Stefan / Hirte, Georg: How does the Household Structure Shape the Urban 
Economy? 
08/09  Lessmann, Christian: Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity: Evidence from Cross-section 
and Panel Data 
09/09  Lessmann, Christian / Markwardt, Gunther: Aid, Growth and Decentralization  
10/09  Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E. / Wessel, Christoph: Export and Benefits of Hedging in Emerging 
Economies 
11/09  Rudolph, Stephan: The Gravity Equation with Micro-Founded Trade Costs 
12/09  Biswas, Amit K.: Import Tariff Led Export Under-invoicing: A Paradox 
13/09  Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Mitigation of Foreign Direct Investment – Risk and Hedging 
14/09  Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Güterwirtschaftliches Risikomanagement: - Ein Entscheidungsmodell zur 
Lagerpolitik bei Unsicherheit 
15/09  Lukas, Daniel: Efficiency Effects of Cross-Border Medical Demand 
16/09  Broll, Udo / Bieta, Volker / Milde, Hellmuth / Siebe, Wilfried: Strategic Pricing of Financial Options 
16/09  Broll, Udo / Bieta, Volker / Milde, Hellmuth / Siebe, Wilfried: Strategic Pricing of Financial Options 
17/09  Broll, Udo / Wahl, Jack E.: Liquidity Constrained Exporters: Trade and Futures Hedging 
01/10  Rudolph, Stephan: Estimating Gravity Equations with Endogenous Trade Costs 
02/10 L u k a s ,   D a n i e l   /   W e r b l o w ,   A n d r e a s :   Grenzen der Spezialisierung grenzüberschreitender 
Gesundheitsversorgung im Rahmen des Heckscher-Ohlin Modells  